Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation by Charness, Gary & Jackson, Matthew O.
Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation 
 
Gary Charness             Matthew O. Jackson 
 
 
Abstract 
We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy 
it will play through a vote by its members.  When groups consist of two voting players, our 
games can also be interpreted as network-formation games.  In experiments on Stag Hunt games, 
we find that that the structure of the voting rule completely determines which equilibrium is 
played, independently of the payoff structure.   Thus, we find a stark contrast between how 
groups and individuals play our games, with payoffs playing a much more important role in 
equilibrium selection in the latter case.  We also explore play between groups where one member 
of each group dictates the play of that group.  We find that the dictator tends to play a less risky 
strategy when choosing for a group than when playing only for him or herself.  
We develop a new solution concept, robust-belief equilibrium, which explains the data 
that we observe.  We provide results showing that this solution concept has application beyond 
the particular games in our experiments. 
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Introduction 
 
The decisions made by many social and economic organizations or groups involve some 
sort of consent.  While classical models in economics treat firms as if they were individual 
decision makers, a firm generally comprises many agents who each have some input into the 
actions of the firm.  In most organizations, some committee of members oversees the decisions 
of the organization and votes on critical decisions.  There is typically some specified method of 
aggregating the agents’ preferences into a group decision, and the nature of this method can have 
important consequences for the organization’s behavior. 
While it has long been recognized that treating firms and other organizations as 
individual decisions makers is at best an imperfect approximation, there is little that is known, 
theoretically, empirically, or experimentally, that discerns how groups interact compared to 
individuals. In this paper we look explicitly at the play of a game when the ‘players’ are actually 
groups of players.    One of our main findings is that the play of games between groups of 
players is systematically different than games between individuals, even though all traditional 
game-theoretic equilibrium concepts do not provide any distinction in the games we examine.  
This prompts us to develop a new equilibrium concept to explain our observations. 
To discuss our approach and analysis, it is easiest to fix ideas directly in terms of the 
game that we use in the experimental part of our study.  Consider the following variation on 
Rousseau's classic Stag Hunt game.   
  Player 2 
  Stag Hare 
Stag 9, 9 1, 8 
Player 1 
Hare 8, 1 8, 8 
 
There are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: one where both players play Stag, and 
another where both players play Hare.1  
Let us consider the case where a ‘player’ is actually a couple.  That is, there are two 
individuals who fill the role of a given player - and both of these individuals receive that player's 
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payoffs.  We now have to be explicit about how the couple determines whether to play Stag or 
Hare.  There are different ways in which a couple could decide on how to play.  The three 
prominent ones are: 
• One of the two individuals dictates. 
• The couple votes over which strategy to play by one of the following two methods: 
-- It takes two votes for Stag to play Stag, and one vote for Hare to play Hare. 
-- It takes one vote for Stag to play Stag, and two votes for Hare to play Hare. 
 
Once we specify the method by which each couple makes the decision to play, the overall 
game is fully specified, so that we can solve for the equilibria of the larger four-player game.  It 
is easy to see that regardless of the way in which the couples make their decisions, there will still 
be an equilibrium in which both couples play Stag, and another equilibrium in which both 
couples play Hare.  In fact, it is clear that this is a much more general phenomenon:  Any pure-
strategy equilibrium of a game with ‘individual players’ remains an equilibrium of the game 
where groups fill the roles of players, regardless of the way in which the groups make decisions.2 
Given this observation, one might wonder whether there is anything interesting to learn 
about groups playing games in situations where each group’s members share the same payoffs. 
We find that some equilibria are more pertinent when groups play than when individual players 
do, and that this selection among equilibria depends on the method by which the group makes 
decisions.  We argue that there is a (formal) sense in which one of the two equilibria becomes 
more ‘focal’.   On an intuitive level this is quite easy to see.  Suppose that both couples make 
decisions through a voting system where it takes two votes to play Stag and one vote to play 
Hare.  In this situation, it is ‘easier’ for a couple to decide to play Hare.  This in turn can feed 
into the expectations that one couple has about the other couple's play, and so forth.  This leads 
to a prediction that the Hare equilibrium is the focal one in cases where it takes two votes to play 
Stag and one vote to play Hare.  Correspondingly, the Stag equilibrium becomes more focal if 
the voting system is such that it takes two votes to play Hare.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 The selection between these equilibria (and those in related coordination games) has been the subject of much 
study.  See for instance, Harsanyi and Selten (1988), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (2003), and the literature that 
followed. 
2 This is provided the group decision-making system has a full range.  Specifying any actions that lead to the 
candidate strategy leads to a situation where no group member can benefit from a deviation. 
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We come back to offer a formal analysis of this in Section 4, but for now let us take the 
view that the focal equilibrium play is the one which takes only one vote by either member of a 
couple to undertake. 
 
The Role of Responsibility in Group Play  
There are several considerations that go into an individual’s decision in forming links or 
playing a game as part of a group.  The individual has to forecast how the other group will 
behave.  The individual also has to forecast how the other members of his or her group will 
behave.  Beyond that, there can be a realization that one's actions have an impact on the payoffs 
of the other members of one’s group. For instance, if an individual can form a link unilaterally, 
then an individual’s decision can have an immediate impact on the partner's payoff without that 
partner having consented.  How does being responsible for another person's payoffs influence 
behavior?  Charness (2000) suggests that an agent with such responsibility will behave in a more 
‘pro-social’ manner.  Here, it is not completely obvious what `pro-social’ is, as there is not any 
sort of free-riding problem; however we might expect this to translate into playing a safer 
strategy when a non-enfranchised person’s welfare is at stake than when all members of a group 
take part in the decision-making. 
Sorting out this last question is a bit tricky since any consideration of such responsibility 
can become entangled with beliefs in the context of the play of a game.   In order to see how 
feelings of responsibility might be influencing play, we ran two additional treatments in addition 
to the group-play treatments we have already described.  The first was a control treatment in 
which there were just two players, one in each role. These games with individual players and no 
couples, served as a benchmark for all of our analysis.  We also ran some additional games with 
a very simple variation designed to allow us to detect the role of responsibility.  We introduced 
couples into the player roles, but only one individual in the couple made the decision:  he or she 
was a dictator for the couple.  If being responsible for another player's payoff had no effect on 
how individuals act, then the play in the benchmark treatment and ‘couples with dictators’ 
treatment should be exactly the same.  If there is a significant difference, then it means that being 
completely responsible for another individual’s payoff influences the way in which an individual 
plays a game.  Indeed, as we shall see, this does influence play. 
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The Related Literature 
 There are only a modest number of contributions from the economics and game theory 
literatures on games played by groups.3  From the theory side, Duggan (2001) defines “group 
Nash” equilibria and examines the group decision-making processes that allow for the existence 
of equilibrium when individuals in a group may have different payoff structures.   
Experimentally, Cason and Mui (1997) consider individual and team choices in a dictator 
game, with group choices more generous than individual choices.  In contrast, Cox (2002) finds 
that groups behave similarly to individuals as senders in an investment game, but send back 
much less.  Blinder and Morgan (forthcoming) find that groups were just as quick as individuals 
to reach decisions and also outperform individuals.  Cooper and Kagel (2003) study the 
behavior of individuals and two-player teams in signaling games; teams consistently play more 
strategically than individuals do.  Similarly, Kocher and Sutter (forthcoming) find that groups 
learn more quickly than individuals in a beauty contest (guessing game). 
Gary Bornstein and co-authors have a series of experimental papers on group play in 
social dilemmas, with particular emphasis on inter-group competition on group performance.  
Perhaps the most closely related paper is Bornstein, Gneezy, and Nagel (2002) who examine a 
variation of Van Huyck’s (1990) minimum-effort game, where two groups play the game and 
only the group with the higher minimum receives a non-zero payoff (in the case of a tie, both 
groups earn half of this payoff).  They find that such a form of inter-group competition leads to 
higher efforts and improved collective efficiency relative to the usual minimum-effort game.    
In all of these games, groups either reach a unanimous decision after some form of 
communication or adopt the minimum (and therefore unanimous) choice.  One paper that does 
consider a non-consensus aggregation rule is by Fréchette, Kagel, and Lehrer (2003), who 
examine amendment rules in legislative bargaining; while the distribution of benefits is rather 
egalitarian among winning coalition members, voters outside these coalitions receive little.   
Our focus is on how the play of a game depends on the aggregation process of the 
individual choices in groups, and how this influences the beliefs and behavior of players.  The 
structure of our games bears no resemblance to that in any of the papers mentioned above. 
                                                          
3 As one would expect, the social-psychology literature has many studies of inter-group relations.   Sherif (1966) 
and Tajfel (1982) provide extensive surveys of some of the classic theories of how groups interact.  While this is a 
rich literature, we have not found any predictions that would help us select between the multiple equilibria in the 
games we study.  
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 1. Network Formation and Consent 
Our analysis also has a completely different interpretation, and implications for a 
different area of study.  In fact, our initial interest in this project originated from thinking about 
differences in protocols for network formation.  
In many social and economic networks it takes the consent of both parties to maintain a 
link or tie.  This includes such varied applications as friendships, political alliances, trading 
relationships, partnerships, etc.  In some other contexts a tie can be formed unilaterally – one 
web site can link to another or one author can cite another, without having mutual consent.  How 
does this difference in the consent needed to form a link affect the network that emerges?   
Network formation maps directly to the analysis of the Stag Hunt as follows.  The choice 
of play by a couple is whether or not to form a link.  The ‘voting rule’ then translates into 
whether or not one needs the consent of both individuals to form a link or whether just one 
individual can form a link. For instance, consider starting at the following network, with 
corresponding payoffs to each one of the players.   From here players can choose whether or not 
to add the missing links.  
       A        B 
          (9)                                  (9) 
 
 
      
            
 
 
 
               
            C       D 
       (9)                    (9) 
 
Players A and D might be thought of as the row group in the Stag Hunt game, and players 
B and C might be thought of as the column group in the Stag Hunt game.   Playing Hare may be 
thought of as having the pair of players not add a link between them.  Playing Stag may be 
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thought of as adding a link between the two players.  Thus, if A and D add a link between 
themselves, while B and C do not, then we end up with the following network and payoffs: 
      A        B 
          (8)                                  (1) 
 
 
      
            
 
 
 
               
            C       D 
       (1)                    (8) 
 
If both groups add a link, then we end up with the following network and payoffs:  
      A        B 
          (8)                                  (8) 
 
 
      
            
 
 
 
               
            C       D 
       (8)                    (8) 
 
If mutual consent is required to add a link, this is equivalent to having both players have 
to vote Hare in order to play Hare.   If either player in a group can add a link unilaterally, then 
this corresponds to a single vote being enough to play Hare.   Thus the two variations on this 
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network game where we vary the consent needed to form a link correspond exactly to the Stag 
Hunt game played between two groups where the voting rule is varied.4 
The reasoning that corresponds to that of what is ‘focal’ when groups play Stag Hunt is 
as follows.  In the game where unilateral consent is needed to form a link, it is ‘easier’ to form 
links, and one should expect them to form.   If it is more likely that the other pair will add their 
link, then it is a best response to add a link.    In contrast, when it takes mutual consent to form a 
link, then it can be more difficult for either group to form a link and thus the network where no 
links are formed becomes more focal.    
In terms of predictions from the network-formation literature, we again find that there are 
multiple equilibria.5  For instance, if mutual consent is needed to form a link then we can use the 
concept of pairwise stability from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) to develop predictions of which 
links will form.  This asks that no two players wish to add a link, and no single player wishes to 
delete a link.   Here, (subject to the constraint that the initial four links cannot be altered) both 
the network where neither link is formed and the network where both links are formed are 
pairwise stable.   In the case where single consent is needed, then the game can be viewed as a 
variation on a link-formation game proposed by Myerson (1990) (see also Bala and Goyal 2000), 
and Nash equilibrium can be used as a solution concept.  Again, there are two (pure-strategy) 
equilibrium network configurations: one where neither link is added and the other where both 
links are added.    In order to select among the equilibria, we need to employ some coalitional 
refinement.  In the case of mutual consent, strong stability from Jackson and van den Nouweland 
(2001) will single out the networks that lead to the payoffs of nine, and similarly strong Nash 
equilibrium will do the same in the case of unilateral link formation. 
 
 
                                                          
4 Note that there are other variations of the above network formation game that we can consider.  In addition to the 
two variations that we have already described, we can also reverse the payoff structure.  That is, we could have 
payoffs of 8 when neither link is added, payoffs of 9 when both links are added, and, when exactly one link is added, 
payoffs of 1 for the group adding a link and payoffs of 8 for the group not forming a link.  While these are 
seemingly different variations on the games, they are again completely strategically equivalent to the others.  We ran 
these variations to check that the framing was not important, and indeed found the results to be indistinguishable 
across framing, as we detail below.    
5 See Jackson (2003) for a survey of models of network formation. 
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2. Experimental Description and Hypotheses 
 
3.1 The Experiment 
We conducted a series of experiments in six separate sessions at the University of 
California at Santa Barbara.  There were 16 participants in each session, with average earnings of 
about $15 (including a $5 show-up payment) for a one-hour session.  The experiments were 
framed in terms of the formation of links in a network.  The complete instructions are presented 
in Appendix D.  Our experiment was programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 1999).  
Participants were sorted randomly into groups, typically with four people in a group.  We 
imposed the initial link network structure of a ‘square’, where each person was linked to two 
adjacent parties, with no diagonal links.  In three of our sessions, this was the initial network: 
 
             A            B 
            (9)            (9) 
      
            
 
 
 
               
             C            D 
        (9)                (9) 
 
The issue of choice was whether to add a diagonal link, as we described in the 
introduction. If neither diagonal link was created, each person received nine experimental units.  
If both diagonal links were created, each person received a payoff of eight. If only one diagonal 
link was created, the people at the nodes of this link received eight, while the people not 
connected by a diagonal link received only one.  
In the other three sessions, we started with lower default payoffs and also altered the way 
that payoffs were determined by the links added. 
 
              
8
             A            B 
 
            (8)            (8) 
      
            
 
 
 
               
             C            D 
        (8)                (8) 
 
In these sessions, if no diagonal links were added, then each person received a payoff of 
eight experimental units.  If both diagonal links were added, then each person received a payoff 
of nine.  If only one diagonal link was created, the people at the nodes of this link received only 
one, while the people not connected by a diagonal link received eight.   
The contrast between the two sessions is one of framing, as we shall discuss more fully 
below, as in one case the risk-dominant play is to not add a link while in the other it is to add a 
link. 
There were 60 periods in a session, comprised of four 15-period segments with different 
decision rules for whether a diagonal link was created.  These segments differed with respect to 
the decision rules for creating a diagonal link.  The people in each group were matched with each 
other for the 15 periods in a segment; after each segment, participants were randomly re-
matched.  Each person was involved exactly once in each of these four different cases: 
 
1) Mutual consent: People are in 4-person groups.  Consider the two people diagonally 
across from each other: A link is added if and only if both of these people wish to add it. 
2) Unilateral consent: People are in 4-person groups.  Consider the people diagonally 
across from each other: A link is added if and only if at least one of these people wishes 
to add it. 
3) 2 play for 4: People are in 4-person groups.  However, only two of these people will 
make choices in the game (say players A and C in the above diagrams), and they can 
unilaterally decide whether or not to add their corresponding links.   Each one of these 
people is paired with a silent partner (say players B and D in the above diagrams) who is 
inactive in the game but whose payoff depends on the play of the game.     
 9
4) 2 play for 2: People are in 2-person groups.  In this case each person controls two 
vertices that are diagonally opposed to each other (so, one player controls vertices A and 
D and the other controls B and C).  So, one player decides whether one link is added and 
the other player controls the other link.  If a player chooses to add a link, then it is added 
and he or she receives the payoff that either of his or her vertices would earn. 
 
Participants always knew which case applied before making a decision.  Once the 
decisions for the period were reached, each person learned his or her payoff, the choice of his or 
her partner (diagonal counterpart), and whether or not the other group (off-diagonals) added a 
link.  Participants also knew that they would learn this information before making subsequent 
choices. 
 
3.2 Hypotheses   
As noted above, solution concepts such as pairwise stability and Nash equilibrium do not 
result in multiple equilibria in our games, and thus leave much open in terms of how play might 
proceed.   We can look to ideas such as risk and payoff dominance to try to select among the 
equilibria.  The notion of risk dominance is consistent with both groups choosing Hare and the 
notion of payoff dominance is consistent with both players choosing Stag.6  We wish to remain 
agnostic regarding the relative merits of payoff dominance and risk dominance, but note that 
play should be the same across all treatments if either notion were a consistent underlying force.  
We find nothing else in conventional theory to guide us.  Thus, we formulate four null 
hypotheses based on the view that behavior will not vary across our experimental games.   
 
Hypothesis 1: (No Effect of Consent) There will be no difference in link formation between the 
mutual-consent and the unilateral-consent treatments, all else held constant. 
 
Hypothesis 2: (No Effect of Payoff Structure) Link formation will not differ depending on 
where we start (whether the payoffs are 8 or 9 when no diagonal links are formed), all else held 
constant.  
                                                          
6 We need to be a bit careful here, as with four players the ideas apply slightly differently than with just two.  
Nevertheless, the risk-dominant play is still for every player to play Hare, regardless of the voting rule, and payoff 
dominance has both groups playing Stag, regardless of the voting rule.   
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 Hypothesis 3: (No Framing Effects) Link Formation will not differ in the games starting with 
9’s and mutual consent and that starting with 8’s and unilateral consent; and similarly play will 
not differ in the games starting with 8’s and mutual consent and those starting with 9’s and 
unilateral consent.  
 
Hypothesis 4: (No Responsibility Effect) There will be no difference in link formation across 
the 2-for-4 and 2-for-2 treatments, all else held constant. 
 
 
 The above hypotheses are not nested nor are they mutually exclusive, so there is a variety 
of alternative hypotheses to various sets of the above.  Rather than list all of the possible 
alternatives, let us mention a few.   
 In the mutual-consent and unilateral-consent treatments, if we adopt the view that links 
will form if and only if formation requires only one vote, we have an alternative hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: There will be more links formed in the unilateral-consent treatments than in the 
mutual-consent treatments, regardless of the starting payoffs.  
 
 
This is the critical alternative hypothesis that the method by which groups make decisions affects 
play.  
There are two different views as to how payoffs might affect play, depending on whether 
one looks to payoff or risk dominance.  Strong stability and strong Nash equilibrium give clear 
predictions in favor of play resulting in payoffs of 9’s, while risk dominance gives a clear 
prediction in favor of play resulting in payoffs of 8’s.  We thus have two alternative hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: There will be more links formed in games starting with 8’s than in the games 
starting with 9’s.  
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Hypothesis 2b: There will be more links formed in games starting with 9’s than in the games 
starting with 8’s 
 
 
In terms of an alternative hypothesis to the null that framing has no effect on the play of 
the game, an alternative is that players will have a tendency to stay with the starting network: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The predominant play will be not to form links.   
  
Finally, in terms of an alternative hypothesis to the fact that responsibility will not affect 
play, we suggest the following alternative.  If we expect people to be less aggressive if they are 
responsible for a partner’s payoff, then: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: There will be more links formed in the 2-play-for-2 treatment than in the 2-for-4 
treatment, when starting at 8’s, and vice versa when starting at 9’s.  
 
 
3. Analysis of the Experimental Results 
 
In this section, we first present tables and summary statistics to illustrate our results.  We 
then perform hypothesis tests, analyzing our data from the standpoints of individual behavior 
patterns and the outcomes by independent 4-person groups, and close with a discussion of 
changes in play, both over time and as a function of ‘bad’ outcomes experienced. 
 
3.1 Summary statistics and charts   
Table 1 shows the group outcomes reached in each of our games: 
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Table 1 – Group Outcomes 
Game No links One Link Both Links 
Start with 9’s    
Mutual  161 (89.4%) 7 (3.9%) 12 (6.7%) 
Unilateral 16 (8.9%) 9 (5.0%) 155 (86.1%) 
2 play for 4 74 (41.1%) 27 (15.0%) 79 (43.9%) 
2 play for 2 190 (52.8%) 33 (9.2%) 137 (38.0%) 
   
Start with 8’s    
Mutual 134 (74.4%) 16 (8.9%) 30 (16.7%) 
Unilateral 26 (14.4%) 5 (2.8%) 149 (82.8%) 
2 play for 4 99 (55.0%) 21 (11.7%) 60 (33.3%) 
2 play for 2 108 (30.0%) 35 (9.7%) 217 (60.3%) 
 
  
Table 1 already gives us a strong look at the hypotheses, and makes it pretty clear what 
the conclusions will be.   While we return to careful statistical tests of the hypotheses with the 
full data set, let us discuss what these aggregate statistics suggest.   
Hypothesis 1, that consent does not matter, will be soundly rejected in favor of the 
alternative that there are more links formed under unilateral consent - that is, the group decision 
making rule is an (the) important factor in determining play and it goes in favor of the decision 
that requires the least votes or consent to achieve.   We see this in the contrast between play 
between mutual and unilateral consent in each of the cases.  In particular, under unilateral 
consent links form in 86.1 and 82.8 percent of the plays, in the starting at 9’s and starting at 8’s 
respectively.  This is in stark contrast with the formation of links in only 6.7 and 16.7 percent of 
the corresponding plays under mutual consent.   As we shall see in the formal hypothesis tests 
below, this is a significant difference. 
Hypothesis 2, that the payoff structure does not matter, is not quite as obvious.  While 
link formation seems driven mostly by the consent rule independently of the starting payoffs, 
there are some slight differences across the starting payoff states.  Curiously, however, there is 
no clear pattern in how the payoff structure matters.  With mutual consent, we see slightly less 
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link formation when starting with 9’s than when starting with 8’s, but with unilateral consent this 
direction is reversed.   We revisit this in more detail in the formal tests of the hypotheses below.  
Hypothesis 3, that the framing is irrelevant, is also largely consistent with the data.  This 
hypothesis is based on the observation that the mutual consent starting at 9’s is strategically 
equivalent to the unilateral consent starting at 8’s, and similarly that the mutual consent starting 
at 8’s is strategically equivalent to the unilateral consent starting at 9’s.   Indeed, these different 
treatments exhibit very similar play.   
 Hypothesis 4, that responsibility does not matter, will be rejected in favor of Hypothesis 
4a, that players play more conservatively when responsible another’s welfare.  We see this as the 
(9,9) outcome is attained substantially more frequently than the (8,8) outcome in both of the two 
playing for two games compared to the two playing for four games.   The difference is 
particularly strong when the network starts with the (9,9) payoff.  
         We also observe that the highly-unattractive ‘one link’ (1,8) outcome is relatively rare, 
occurring in only 153 of 1800 cases across all games, or 8.5% of the time.   In the few cases 
where there is some coordination failure in initial periods, we often see rapid movement to 
successful coordination. 
A different way to look at the data is to consider the individual choices.  It is important to 
look at individual data in order to get a fuller feeling for differences in play.   For instance, 
suppose that players were simply flipping coins in order to decide whether or not to vote to form 
a link.  In that case, more links would be formed under unilateral consent than mutual consent, 
and not because their play was influenced by the structure of the consent rule, but simply 
because of the consent rule.   In order to test that players’ decisions are actually influenced by the 
consent rule, among other things, we can look at individual level data.     
Table 2 – Individual Choices 
Game No Link Link 
Start with 9’s   
mutual consent 512 (71.1%) 208 (28.9%) 
unilateral consent 191 (26.5%) 529 (73.5%) 
2 play for 4 175 (48.6%) 185 (51.4%) 
2 play for 2 413 (57.4%) 307 (42.6%) 
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Start with 8’s   
mutual consent 455 (63.2%) 265 (37.8%) 
unilateral consent 185 (25.7%) 535 (74.3%) 
2 play for 4 219 (60.8%) 141 (39.2%) 
2 play for 2 251 (34.9%) 469 (65.1%) 
 
 
The patterns seen in Table 1 are also apparent in Table 2, although the differences are not 
quite as extreme (but are nevertheless highly significant, as we shall see).   
We can also consider the choice tendencies of each individual in each game, as well as 
individual profiles across the three or four games each person played.  Table 3 shows how many 
people in each game either added or didn’t add links (or mixed), as well as how common it was 
for an individual to change his or her strategy over the course of a 15-period segment, and in 
which direction (from link to don’t link, or vice versa): 
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Table 3 – Individual Choice Tendencies, by Game 
Game No Link Mix Link Link⇒No Link No Link⇒Link
Start with 9’s      
mutual 34 1 13 4 2 
unilateral 6 8 34 2 20 
2 play for 4 10 3 11 1 5 
2 play for 2 22 0 26 1 7 
Start with 8’s      
mutual 31 4 13 13 1 
unilateral 11 0 37 2 5 
2 play for 4 15 1 8 6 1 
2 play for 2 17 1 30 6 2 
“Mix” means that an individual chose each action at least six times (out of 15) 
 
 
We see that individual behavior mirrors the patterns observed in Tables 1 and 2.  We also 
see a substantial difference between choices in 2 play for 4 versus 2 play for 2 when starting with 
8’s, but only a small difference when starting with 9’s.   
In the games starting with 9’s, there were 42 switches out of 168 possible (25.0%), while 
in the games starting with 8’s, there were 36 switches out of 168 possible (21.4%); in the 
aggregate, people changed their choice 23.2% of the time.  In the preponderance of these cases 
(61 of 78, or 78.2%), we see that this change went from voting for the risky play (trying for 9) to 
voting for the safe play (8 for sure).7  While payoff dominance is ultimately trumped by the 
consent rule, this suggests that many people have some initial attraction to payoff dominance.   
 Table 4 shows individual profiles across all pairs of games.  The complete profiles across 
all games each person played are shown in Appendix C. 
                                                          
7 Recall that when starting at 9’s, a group can guarantee itself a payoff of 8 by adding a link, and when starting at 
8’s, this safe payoff is instead guaranteed by not adding a link. 
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Table 4 – Individual Profiles  
Game pair NN NM NL MN MM ML LN LM LL 
Start with 9’s          
mutual &unilateral 5 6 23 0 1 0 1 1 11 
2 for 4 & 2 for 2 9 0 1 2 0 1 3 0 8 
Start with 8’s          
mutual & unilateral 10 0 21 0 0 4 1 0 12 
2 for 4 & 2 for 2 7 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 8 
In this Table, “N” means voted for No Link, “M” means Mix, and “L” means voted for Link 
 
 
Regarding the mutual and unilateral game-pair, 39 people out of 96 (40.6%) played about 
the same in both games.  We see that in games starting with 9’s, many more people did not add 
links under mutual consent and added links under unilateral consent than the other way around; 
the reverse is true in the games starting with 8’s.  Overall, for the 57 people whose choice 
behavior differed across the mutual- and unilateral-consent treatments, 54 of the differences 
(94.7%) favor being an individual being more aggressive when going Stag (trying for 9) requires 
only one vote of the two (mapping to mutual consent when starting with 9’s or to unilateral 
consent when starting with 8’s). 
In the 2-for-2 and 2-for-4 games, 2/3 of all people (32 of 48) play about the same whether 
they are choosing only for themselves or are responsible for another person’s payoff.  In the 
games starting with 9’s, five people play more aggressively and two people play less 
aggressively when on their own (2 for 2).  In the games starting with 8’s, nine people play more 
aggressively and no people play less aggressively when on their own. 
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3.2 Hypothesis tests 
 In order to deal with the problem of possibly non-independent multiple observations, we 
follow a couple of approaches in testing our hypotheses.  First, we look at the behavior of each 
individual in each segment, thereby obtaining one observation for each 15 periods.  Second, 
since there are possible interaction effects, a more conservative test involves average rates for 
adding links for each group in our sessions.  These different approaches also differ in terms of 
whether they examine individual behavior or equilibrium play.      
Hypothesis 1.  The data in Tables 1 and 2 show large differences in play, holding starting 
payoffs constant, according to whether mutual consent or unilateral consent is needed to form a 
diagonal link.   This is depicted in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1 - Link Formation in Four-voter Games
Mutual (9's)
Mutual (8's)
Unilateral (8's)
Unilateral (9's)
 
Figure 1 illustrates the central finding of our experiments very starkly:  Play is almost 
entirely dictated by the consent/voting structure, essentially independently of the payoff 
structure.  If we combine the mutual plays and unilateral plays across starting payoffs, we see the 
difference between consent/voting structures most vividly, as pictured in Figure 2 below.   
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Since each person plays both mutual-consent and unilateral-consent games, we can 
examine whether these patterns are found within each individual’s choices in these games.  Table 
4 shows that 23 people in the start-with-9 treatment played less ‘safe’ and only one person 
played ‘safer’ in the mutual-consent treatment (only one vote needed to go Stag).  Similarly, 21 
people in the start-with-8 treatment played less safe and only one person played safer in the 
unilateral-consent treatment (only one vote needed to go Stag).  If play was unaffected by the 
consent rule, we should expect to see the number of people playing safer under mutual consent to 
be about the same as the number of people playing safer under unilateral consent, and clearly this 
is not the case.  Simple binomial tests on these within-individual data find both of these 
differences are highly significant (Z = 4.49 and 4.26, respectively, p < 0.00001 in each case).   
A more conservative Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test (see Siegel and Castellan 
1988) using group-level averages confirms significance for these differences (Z = 2.95, p = 0.002 
and Z = 1.91, p = 0.028, respectively, one-tailed tests).8  Thus, we can reject Hypothesis 1 in 
favor of the alternative Hypothesis 1a. 
                                                          
8 The tests compare the total number of links formed by each of the twelve groups under the mutual consent with the 
corresponding twelve groups under unilateral consent.  This gives twenty four groups overall.  Each group then has 
a ranking between 1 and 24.  Under the null hypothesis the sum of the rankings for the twelve groups under mutual 
consent should be the same as under unilateral consent, subject to random noise.   The Z-statistic here is from the 
difference between the sum of the rankings, mutual minus unilateral, and so the rankings are lower numbers 
(representing more links) for the unilateral case. 
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 Hypothesis 2.   To examine whether or not the payoff structure affects the link 
formation, we can look back to Figure 1 and make comparisons across starting states.  First, let 
us examine the mutual-consent case, which is drawn out in Figure 3.   
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Figure 3 - Link Formation under Mutual Consent
Mutual (9's)
Mutual (8's)
 
There is a slight tendency (also observed in Tables 1 and 2) for more links to form when starting 
with 8’s than when starting at 9’s, which would be consistent with Hypothesis 2a. 
To test Hypothesis 2 in the mutual-consent games, we first compare link-addition rates in 
the mutual-consent game starting with 9’s and in the mutual-consent games starting with 8’s. 
Using Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of group-level rates when starting with 9’s versus when starting 
with 8’s, we find Z = -1.58 at p = 0.114, on a two-tailed test, and so fail to reject Hypothesis 2.  
A test using individual-level data gives Z = -1.76 at p = 0.078, which is marginally significant 
depending on the significance level desired.9   
The analogous plot for the unilateral case is shown in Figure 4. 
                                                          
9 When testing Hypothesis 1 with the individual level data we were able to do a binomial test, as we had data from 
the same individuals in the two treatments.  Here this test cannot be used (since no individual is in both treatments), 
so we rely instead on the rank-sum test. 
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Figure 4  - Link Formation under Unilateral Consent
Unilateral (8's)
Unilateral (9's)
 
We see a small influence from the starting conditions, although it is a bit ambiguous as 
we see both extremes in terms of voting when starting with 8’s.   
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test using group-level link-formation rates gives Z = -1.27 at p = 
0.204, on a two-tailed test, and so we fail to reject Hypothesis 2 that the payoff structure does not 
matter.   When we examine individual-level data, we obtain Z = -2.32 at p = 0.020 on a two-
tailed test.  Here we reject Hypothesis 2 in favor of Hypothesis 2a, so that more links are formed 
when the payoff to having both links form is nine.  The one-sided tests on the group-level and 
individual-level data yield p = 0.102 and p = 0.010, respectively.   
Curiously, the average link-formation rates in Table 1 for the unilateral case show a slight 
bias towards less link formation when we start at 8’s than when we start at 9’s, which is in 
contrast to the conclusion of the hypothesis test above on the individual-level data (and the 
direction of the statistics for the group-level data10).    A close inspection of the individual-level 
data shows that when we start at 9’s about a fourth of the subjects try to form links between 1/3 
                                                          
10The group results were dichotomous: 21 of 24 groups formed at least 26 of 30 links, while the either three groups 
formed two or fewer links.  There were two groups with few links in the 8’s case, so the average (Table 1) is lower 
in this case.  However, in the 8’s case, only one of the 10 groups with a high linkage rate formed fewer than 30 links 
(29), while in the 9’s case, six of the 11 groups in 9’s with high linkage rates formed between 26 and 29 links.  As 
the rank-sum test does not include any notion of interval, here the difference between the average and the order 
statistics is enough to reverse the direction of the bias.  If we use a slightly more exotic non-parametric test that does 
consider interval, such as the permutation test (see Siegel and Castellan 1988), this significant difference disappears. 
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and 2/3 of the time, while there are no such subjects starting at 8’s (the counterparts in the 8’s 
treatments in terms of rank ordering are attempting to form the links in most all of the periods).    
This difference does not show up in the group link-formation data, as the subjects whose 
choices vary much are almost invariably matched with a partner who has been forming the link 
during the segment, so that the choice one makes is effectively immaterial.    This ‘floater’ 
behavior is enough to provide for a significant difference, while no significant difference appears 
when simply looking at the link-formation rates, and it looks to go in the opposite direction.    
The sensitivity of the conclusions of the tests of Hypothesis 2 to the level on which it is 
examined leads us to be cautious, and to come away with the conclusion that there may be a 
slight bias towards payoff dominance but it is not obvious whether it is significant or not.    
Let us now turn to the data for the two-voter games.  Figures 5 and 6 picture link 
formation in these: 
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Figure 5 - Link Formation in Two-for-Four Games
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Figure 6 - Link Formation in Two-for-Two Games
2 for 2 (9's)
2 for 2 (8's)
 
Figures 5 and 6 show an influence of the payoff structure on link formation.  In the 2-for-
2 games players are more likely to add links when links are the risky (Stag) play than when they 
are the safe (Hare) play.  The reverse is true in the 2-for-4 games.   
When we test Hypothesis 2 using Wilcoxon rank-sum tests on the 2-for-2 games, both 
individual-level and group-level rates of link formation show large differences going against 
Hypothesis 2 and in favor of the alternative Hypothesis 2a (Z = -3.12 and Z = -2.96, respectively) 
and even two-tailed tests of Hypothesis 2 reject it at p = 0.002 and p = 0.003.  The data from the 
2-for-4 games cannot reject Hypothesis 2 using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test with either group-
level or individual data (Z = 0.26 and Z = 0.27, respectively), although they go slightly in the 
direction of Hypothesis 2b.  The contrast between 2-for-2 games and 2-for-4 games is actually 
consistent with Hypothesis 4a, which states that players tend to behave more safely when 
responsible for another’s payoff. 
 
Hypothesis 3.  As mentioned above, the rate of risky play is quite similar across 
‘strategically-equivalent’ games.  This is clear in the following figures: 
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Figure 7 - Stag (Risky) play when it requires one vote
Mutual (9's)
Unilateral (8's)
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Figure 8 - Stag (Risky) Play when it requires two votes
Mutual (8's)
Unilateral (9's)
 
 The Wilcoxon rank-sum test finds no significant difference in individual rates of risky 
play across either the mutual-consent game starting with 9’s and the unilateral-consent game 
starting with 8’s (Z = 0.40, p = 0.689, two-tailed test) or across the mutual-consent game starting 
with 8’s and the unilateral-consent game starting with 9’s (Z = 0.48, p = 0.631, two-tailed test).  
Superficially the games might appear quite different, as they have a different consent structure 
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and payoff structure.  However, the play is unaffected by the framing and matches across 
strategic equivalents and we do not reject Hypothesis 3, while play starkly contrasts across the 
games that are not strategically equivalent.  
All in all, our data support the notion that players play the strategies corresponding to the 
‘easier’ outcome – links form when consent is unilateral and do not form when formation 
requires mutual consent; and that this is independent of the payoff structure and the framing of 
the game.  In terms of the Stag Hunt game, this corresponds to playing the strategy that only 
requires one vote to be played. 
Hypothesis 4.  We refer to Table 4 for individual choice patterns.  It is also helpful to 
look at the data graphically.    We can break these down by different starting conditions.  Figure 
9 considers the frequency of risky play when the starting network is the ‘risky’ one (starting with 
9’s): 
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Figure 9 - Risky (Stag) Play in Two-voter Games 
(Starting with 9's)
2 for 4 (9's)
2 for 2 (9's)
 
We see slightly more risky play in the 2-for-2 games.  Figure 10 depicts the differences 
when starting at 8’s, where the difference is more pronounced. 
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Figure 10 - Risky (Stag) Play in Two-voter Games 
(Starting with 8's)
2 for 4 (8's)
2 for 2 (8's)
 
If we aggregate across strategically-equivalent games, to compare the 2-for-4 games 
versus the 2-for-2 games overall, we end up with Figure 11: 
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Figure 11 - Risky (Stag) Play in Two-voter Games 
(Aggregated)
2 for 4
2 for 2
 
We have only half the number of paired individual comparisons for comparisons between 
the 2-for-4 and 2-for-2 games, as half of the participants did not make choices in the 2-for-4 
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games.  Given the parallels between the starting states noted above, we pool comparisons (2-for-
4’s across starting states and 2-for-2’s across starting states) and find that 14 people made the 
risky play more frequently when on their own than when responsible for a silent partner’s payoff 
and two people played stage less frequently when on their own.  The binary test gives Z = 3.00, 
significant at p = 0.001.  When we use the more conservative test with group averages, we again 
see that aggressive play is more likely in the pooled 2-for-2 treatments than in the pooled 2-for-4 
treatments, although in this case the difference is only marginally significant (Z = 1.34, p = 
0.090, one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test).  Thus, while most people play the same in both cases, 
there seems to be a tendency among a substantial minority of the population to take fewer 
chances when responsible for a non-enfranchised person’s welfare.  We reject Hypothesis 4 in 
favor of Hypothesis 4a. 
 
3.3 Changes over time and determinants 
Does the tendency to play the risky strategy (Stag) change appreciably over time?  If so, 
can we isolate any determinants of this change?  Table 5 shows the average rate of risky play in 
the first five periods of the segment, the middle five periods of the segment, and the last five 
periods of the segment for each of our eight games: 
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Table 5 – Rates of Risky Play over Time, by Game 
 Rate of Risky Play in: 
Game First five 
periods 
Middle five 
periods 
Last five 
periods 
Start with 9’s    
mutual .6875 .7125 7333 
unilateral 3958 .2083 .1917 
2 play for 4 .5250 .4667 .4667 
2 play for 2 .6333 .5458 .5417 
Start with 8’s    
mutual 4392 .3500 .3250 
unilateral .7375 .7417 .7500 
2 play for 4 .4583 .3750 .3417 
2 play for 2 .6875 .6375 .6292 
 
There is generally not much change over time, with a general slight trend toward less 
risky play.  However, we see a substantial drop in risky play from the first five periods to the 
middle five periods for both of the 2-play-for-4 games, as well as for the unilateral treatment and 
the 2-play-for-2 game when starting with 9’s and the mutual treatment when starting with 8’s.    
Why do people switch their behavior over the course of a segment?  One would naturally 
suspect that this decision is correlated with having previously experienced bad (payoff = 1) 
outcomes during the segment.  In fact, random-effects probit regressions strongly confirm this 
conjecture:  
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Table 6 – Determinants for Risky Play When Four People Make Decisions 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent variables Vote for Risky Play 
(1) 
Vote for Risky Play 
(2) 
-1.732*** -1.755*** Two votes to go Stag 
[0.078] [0.079] 
-1.158*** -1.194*** One bad outcome 
[0.151] [0.150] 
-2.635*** -2.754*** Two bad outcomes 
[0.245] [0.244] 
- -0.815*** Three or more bad outcomes 
- [0.213] 
0.468*** 0.503*** Constant 
[0.101] [0.116] 
# Observations 2880 2880 
Log-likelihood -1002.4 -995.2 
Standard errors are in brackets.  *** indicates significance at 0.1% 
 
In these games, people are much more likely to play safe when it takes unanimity for the 
group to make the risky link choice.  A player who has experienced one bad outcome is 
substantially less likely to vote for the risky play.  The effect of a second bad outcome is much 
stronger, as the coefficient is even larger than that for the treatment effect.  However, a person 
who persists in voting for the risky play after two bad outcomes doesn’t seem to care much about 
bad outcomes, as we see in specification (2) that the coefficient for the effect of three or more 
bad outcomes is actually smaller than the coefficient for having had only one bad outcome. 
 
 
4. A Foundation for the Selection of Equilibrium 
Our experiments exhibit patterns and regularities in the way that groups play these 
games.  In particular, while the games in question have multiple strict Nash equilibria, there is a 
tendency to focus in on specific ones:  those ‘favored’ by the voting rule, as evidenced by the 
 29
sound rejection of Hypothesis 1.  This is exhibited even when the payoffs are altered, and so the 
selection cannot be attributed to equilibrium refinements such as risk dominance or payoff 
dominance.  None of the other standard equilibrium refinements, such as trembling hand 
perfection or stochastic stability, predict the selection that the participants are consistently 
making either.11  Nevertheless, there is a clear logic behind the behavior of the subjects, which 
suggests that there should be an equilibrium concept to capture it.   In this section, we use the 
intuition and observed play in these experiments to develop a new equilibrium concept.  It builds 
on tools from perfection and stochastic stability, but in a way to capture the logic that seems to 
be underlying the behavior in our experiments.   
 We begin by explaining the underlying ideas; to do so we consider an abstract two-by-
two game that has two pure-strategy equilibria.  For this discussion, consider a coordination 
game where, as will become clear, the symmetry of payoffs is irrelevant to the general 
development of the solution concept. 
 
 
 
Player 2 Role  
(Group 2) 
 
 
 
A B 
 
A a, a c, d Player 1 Role 
(Group 1)  
B d, c b, b 
 
     
Let a > d and b > c, so that the game has two pure-strategy equilibria, A,A and B,B.  
Assume that (a-d) > (b-c), so that A,A is the risk-dominant equilibrium in the sense of Harsanyi 
                                                          
11 Even the application of the theory of global games (see Carlsson and van Damme 1993) does not work here.  With 
the right specifications of uncertainty, this sort of game can be analyzed using the techniques of Morris, Frankel and 
Pauzner (2001).  However, depending on the structure of uncertainty that is introduced, it seems that the selection is 
made either in favor of the risk dominant, or in favor of the payoff dominant payoffs (viewed as a two-player game); 
and that the selection is not being made relative to the voting rule.   
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and Selten (1988).12  The game in our experiments fits into this setting.  Let each player role be 
filled by some group of at least two individuals.  Describe a group’s method of selecting a 
strategy by a quota rule q, where q in {1,..., n} denotes the minimum number of votes for 
strategy A needed before A is played.  Thus, if q or more members of the group vote to play A, 
then A is played, while if fewer than q members of the group vote to play A, then B is played. 
Let a state be a list of each individual’s play - so it is a vector of length 2n where entries 
are either A or B.  Given a state, each player has a best response.  That is, considering a 
conjecture that other players will play as described in a state, each player has a best response.  A 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is then just a state where the state’s prescription of each player’s 
vote is a best response given the anticipation that the state correctly describes the voting behavior 
of the players. 
There are many pure-strategy equilibria of such a game.  Any profile of votes where both 
groups pick A is an equilibrium; any profile of votes where both groups pick B is an equilibrium; 
and any profile of votes where one group picks A, the other group picks B, and no voter is 
pivotal, is also an equilibrium.   In fact, all of these states are undominated Nash equilibria.13  
Moreover, all voting A is a trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium, as is all voting B.    
The behavior in our experiments, however, picks out the equilibrium that is ‘favored’ by 
the voting rule.  That is, if q is less than or equal to n/2, then all voting A is observed, while if q 
is greater than n/2 then all players voting B is observed.14  On one level we might think of this as 
a ‘focal’ effect, in that the bias in the voting rule focuses attention on one of the equilibria.  Yet, 
there are many different things that might be used to ‘focus’ the attention of the players.  For 
instance, why isn’t it that the highest payoff equilibrium becomes the ‘focal’ one?  The challenge 
for an equilibrium concept is to capture the focal nature of the voting rule, and to do it in a robust 
way that is not ad hoc to the games in question.   
Let us go through some heuristic reasoning that suggests an equilibrium concept.  
Consider a player forecasting the play of the others.  If the player starts agnostically, and simply 
                                                          
12 This equilibrium has the property that each player is choosing a strategy that is also a best response to the other 
player mixing 50/50.  Thus, A is the strategy that is a best response to the largest set of beliefs over possible plays of 
the opponent, and so the risk-dominant equilibrium is the pure-strategy equilibrium with a larger basin of attraction 
than the other pure-strategy equilibrium.  Specifically, playing A is a player’s best response if the probability that his 
opponent plays A is greater than or equal to (b-c)/(a-d+b-c) < 1/2.  Thus if a = 3, b = 1, and c = d = 0, then playing A 
is a best response if the belief is that the probability is 1/4 or more that a player’s opponent plays A. 
13 Some of these can be ruled out by ‘trembling’ arguments, but we still end up with no real selection in outcomes. 
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assumes random voting by the players in the other group, then the forecast would be that the 
other players would end up playing the strategy favored by the voting rule. While this is rather 
simplistic reasoning that does not account for payoffs, we can take it further to consider further 
levels of reasoning.  Imagine now that a player starts with any forecast of other players’ behavior 
based on the payoffs and the structure of the game.  The player can still think about how 
sensitive this forecast is to the play of the others.  For instance, in our games where n = 2 and the 
quota is 1 to play A, then the player realizes that if either of the players in the other group plays 
A then it is in her interest to play A.  Moreover, it is enough for her to believe that one of the 
other players reasons this way to induce one of the other players to play A.   Or, it is enough for 
her to believe that one of the other players might believe that she is going through this logic, etc.   
This suggests looking at basins of attraction of equilibria to try to capture some of this reasoning.   
The primary notion that builds on basins of attraction is stochastic stability.15  Can we 
bring stochastic stability off the shelf and apply it here?  There are two problems.  First, 
stochastic stability is generally used in evolutionary analyses where agents either play games 
against randomly-selected opponents repeatedly over time, or else are playing strategies 
simultaneously against many other players.   This is easily overcome, as it is merely a matter of 
interpretation.16   That is, the machinery of stochastic stability still captures ideas underlying 
basins of attraction and robustness of equilibria even when the game is only played once by a 
given set of players.  The second problem is the more crippling one:  stochastic stability does not 
make much of a selection here.    Let us discuss this in the context of the game we used in our 
experiments, where the voting rule is that it takes one vote to go Stag and two votes to go Hare.    
Consider movement among states, and start at a state where all players vote to go Stag.  
In this case, every player has two best responses:  either voting Stag or Hare.  So, completely 
consistently with best-response behavior, we can move to a state where one player in one of the 
groups votes Hare.  From there we can move to a state where one player in each group votes 
Hare.  Now it takes a single ‘tremble’ or ‘error’ on the part of some player to switch to a state 
where two players in one of the groups vote Hare while only one player in the other group votes 
Hare.  Once in this state, it is now a best response for the only remaining player who is voting 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 We have only examined particular parameter values for the game and number of players, so this is clearly an 
extrapolation of what is occurring in these games.   
15 See Foster and Young (1990), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), and Young (1993) and the literature that follows. 
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Stag to switch to voting Hare.17  So, it took only one tremble or error in this whole sequence to 
get us to move from the equilibrium where all players vote Stag to one where all players vote 
Hare.    It is easy to check that the same is true in reverse.  This means that both equilibria are 
stochastically stable: both will be in the long-run steady-state distribution of a carefully-defined 
Markov process where trembles are introduced.   
What’s missing from this reasoning?    Suppose we start from a state where all players 
vote Stag, and we also know that there is some unpredictability (real or imaginary) in players’ 
votes so that they might vote Hare with a small probability.  That is, players are fully aware of 
the noise in the process and take that into account when making their decisions.  Now, choosing 
Hare makes it more likely that my group will cross the threshold and fail to coordinate, as I 
realize that one tremble by my partner will lead to coordination failure (whereas, by playing Stag 
it will require two errors for coordination failure).  Straightforward calculations show that now 
Hare is the unique best response.18   Now, it takes at least two errors or trembles to get from 
voting Stag to voting Hare, and only one to go back.  Using this reasoning, players being 
somewhat unsure of the other players’ play leads to a unique selection from the game.   The key 
difference between this and the usual definition of stochastic stability is that players are not best-
responding to the state, but rather to the state with the understanding of the full process including 
errors.  This seems like a subtle difference, but it is a critical one not only in changing the 
predictions of the solution concept, but also in capturing the reasoning that might underlie what 
we observe in the experiments.   
Now let us move to a formal definition of the solution concept.  It uses ideas from 
stochastic stability to capture basins of attraction and robustness, and yet has players best-
responding to the actual process to capture the importance of their beliefs (rather than viewing 
players as random mutations in an evolutionary soup).   
We define robust-belief equilibrium for an arbitrary game as follows:    
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16 See Jackson and Watts (2002) for a model of stochastic stability in network formation and some discussion of 
possible interpretations. 
17 We could also have one of the players in the other group switch back to Stag - but that is irrelevant to this 
argument. 
18 There is a probability of (1-ε)3 that all others vote stag, a probability on the order of ε that one other player votes 
Hare, and a probability on the order of ε2 or less that two or more other players vote Hare.  This means voting Stag 
leads to a probability on the order of ε2 for coordination failure, while voting Hare leads to a probability on the order 
of ε for coordination failure.  For small ε the expected payoff is strictly higher from voting Stag. 
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Consider an arbitrary finite game G=(N,S,u), where (with an abuse of notation 
N={1,...,N} is a set of players, S= S1 x... x SN  is the finite set of pure strategies available to 
players, and u=(u1 , ... uN ) is the profile of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, ui : Si  
→R.   Given a game G and an ε > 0, let G(ε) be the following variation on the game.  Each 
player trembles from their prescribed strategy with probability ε, 1 > ε > 0.   In particular, if a 
player chooses a given strategy then with probability 1-ε the player’s strategy is played and with 
probability ε the player’s strategy is chosen to be any action with equal probability.19 
 
Given a game variant G(ε), define a Markov process as follows.   A state is a profile of 
strategies s in S.   For each state, let players pick a best response to that state in the game G(ε) - 
that is forecasting that the other players will try to play according to s, but may tremble.   This 
defines a function β from S to S.   There may be multiple best responses, so there are may be 
multiple functions β.  For small enough ε, some β‘s remain a best-response selection for all 
smaller ε.  Let the set of such β’s that remain best-response selections for small ε’s be denoted 
B(G).   Any selection of best responses β in B(G), together with the tremble probabilities defines 
a transition matrix across states.   We end up with a Markov process M(G,ε,β) that is irreducible 
and aperiodic.   Thus, M(G,ε,β) has a unique steady-state distribution.  
Given a game G=(N,S,u), a robust-belief state is any state that has positive probability 
under the limit of the steady-state distribution of M(G,ε,β) as  ε  goes to 0 for some best-response 
selection β in B(G).    If s is a state that is both a Nash equilibrium and a robust-belief state, then 
it is said to be a robust-belief equilibrium.20 
Given a game G=(N,S,u), a strongly robust-belief state is any state that has positive 
probability under the limit of the steady-state distribution of M(G,ε,β) as  ε  goes to 0 for all best 
response selections β in B(G).    If s is a state that is both a Nash equilibrium and a strongly 
robust-belief state, then it is said to be a strongly robust-belief equilibrium. 
Let us now return to the coordination game mentioned above.   
                                                          
19 One can easily modify this to allow for different ε’s for different players, and to have non-uniform probabilities on 
the actions that are chosen in a ‘tremble’. 
20 In some games (such as matching pennies) the process will cycle among a set of states, none of which are 
equilibria.  In that case, these states might be thought of as robust and ‘likely’ states, but are not equilibria in and of 
themselves.   This means that while robust-belief states will always exist, robust-belief equilibria might not, as this is 
a pure-strategy concept.   
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 Theorem 1 There is a unique robust-belief state in the group-play coordination game where 
both groups vote using the quota q: it is all players voting A if q is less than or equal to n/2, and 
all players voting B otherwise.  Moreover this state is a strongly robust-belief equilibrium. 
 
 
An important observation about Theorem 1 is that the conclusions are completely 
determined by the voting rule and independent of the levels of the payoffs (a,b,c,d - subject to the 
inequalities defining the coordination structure),   Indeed this is consistent with what we observe 
in the experiments! 
The formal proof appears in the appendix, but we present a brief outline here.  For small 
enough ε, any best-response correspondence is such that if the other group is electing to play A, 
then any player should vote to play A, and similarly for B.  This comes from the fact that agents 
are anticipating that there might be trembles by other players and acting accordingly.   This 
means that from any state where both groups are electing A, then all voters will best-respond by 
voting A, and similarly for B.  There is also leads to another situation where one group is 
electing A and the other is electing B, and this will lead all voters in the first group to vote for B 
and all voters in the second group to vote for A.  This provides for two states where the groups 
fail to coordinate and keep ‘flip-flopping’ and continue to fail to coordinate.  Any state thus leads 
naturally through best responses to one of these situations.    
In order to determine what the robust-belief states are, we need to see how hard it is to 
move from one of these three classes of situations to another.   The key to the theorem is that it 
takes at least n-q+1 ‘trembles’ in order to leave the situation where all voters are voting A, q 
trembles to leave a situation where all voters are voting B, and the minimum of these two 
numbers to leave the ‘flip-flopping states’.   The state that is hardest to leave in this setting ends 
up being the one which gets all of the probability in the steady state distribution when ε becomes 
small.   This is entirely determined by which is the larger of q and n-q+1, and must be either the 
state where all voters vote for A or the state where all voters vote for B.   
 
   
5. Conclusion 
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We have explored behavior in a Stag Hunt that can be interpreted as either endogenous 
link-formation in networks or as a study of how the voting rule that a group uses for decision 
making impacts the play of a game.  We find a stark contrast between how groups and 
individuals play our games; in the group games, the decision rule is the primary determinant of 
play, independently of the payoff structure – when hunting Stag requires unanimous consent 
(two votes), few people elect to hunt Stag; however, when it only takes one vote to hunt Stag, 
few people elect to hunt Hare.   Thus, even when group members all have the same payoff 
structure, we have different predictions for how groups play games compared to how individuals 
play games.  To encapsulate our findings about group decision-making in a theoretical 
framework, we develop a new solution concept, robust-belief equilibrium.   
We also find that the behavior of about one-third of the population is sensitive to the 
issue of being responsible for another person’s welfare.   In about 90% of these cases, the decider 
takes on less risk when he or she is the agent for another party than when acting only for him or 
herself.   
As our experiments were limited to a specific game, it would be interesting to see to what 
extent group decision making processes are critical determinants of play in other sorts of games, 
and more generally how this varies with the structure of the game.   It would also be interesting 
to further investigate the behavior of robust-belief equilibria. 
Let us close with a final observation regarding our experimental results.  The equilibrium 
notions here are myopic ones.  There are also notions of farsighted network formation, such as 
those of Page, Wooders and Kamat (2001) and Dutta, Ghosal and Ray (2003).   In the context of 
the networks we have examined, they would select equilibria where the efficient network is 
formed (all 9’s).21   This is not the behavior observed here, although perhaps because our setting 
is sufficiently different in structure so as not to favor such forward-looking behavior.22   
 
 
                                                          
21 The Dutta, Ghosal and Ray (2003) definition is in the context of an infinite game of network formation, and 
would require a sufficiently high discount factor.   Their analysis would not have any specific prediction in the 
context of our game as it is outside of their setting.  Nevertheless, the reasoning that they are attempting to capture is 
consistent with some of the attempts of players in the game to play Stag, with the hope that others will see this and 
follow suit.   The analysis of Page, Wooders and Kamat (2001) is independent of a particular protocol, as it builds 
on Chwe’s (1994) largest consistent set.   
22 See Pantz, K. and A. Ziegelmeyer (2003) for a more detailed study of myopic versus farsighted behavior in 
network formation. 
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Appendix A 
 
 Proof of Theorem 1:     
A theorem from Young (1993) is instrumental in the proof of Proposition 1.  Before stating 
Young’s theorem, the following definitions from Young (1993) are needed. 
 
Consider a stationary Markov process on a finite state space X with transition matrix P.  
 
A set of mutations of P is a range (0,a] and a stationary Markov process on X with transition 
matrix P(ε)  for each ε  in (0,a], such that (i) P(ε) is aperiodic and irreducible for each  ε  in (0,a], 
(ii) P(ε) →P, and (iii) P(ε)xy>0 implies that there exists r ≥ 0 such that 0 < lim ε-r P(ε) xy <∞.   
 
The number r in (iii) above is the resistance of the transition from state x to y.  There is a path 
from x to z of zero resistance if there is a sequence of states starting with x and ending with z 
such that the transition from each state to the next state in the sequence is of zero resistance.  
Note that from (ii) and (iii), this implies that if there is a path from x to z of zero resistance, then 
the n-th order transition probability associated with P of x to z is positive for some n. 
 
The recurrent communication classes of P, denoted X1,…,XJ, are disjoint subsets of states such 
that (i) from each state there exists a path of zero resistance leading to a state in at least one 
recurrent communication class, (ii) any two states in the same recurrent communication class are 
connected by a path of zero resistance (in both directions), and (iii) for any recurrent 
communication class X j and states x in Xj and y not in Xj   such that P(ε)xy  > 0,  the resistance of 
the transition from x to y is positive.   
 
For two communication classes Xi  and Xj , since each  P(ε) is irreducible, it follows that there is 
a sequence of states x1,…xk with x1 in Xi  and xk in Xj  such that the resistance of transition from 
xk to xk+1 is defined by (iii) and finite.  Denote this by r(xk,xk+1).   Let the resistance of transition 
from Xi  to Xj  be the minimum over all such sequences of  Σ1Κ−1 r(xk,xk+1), and denote it by r(Xi , 
Xj ). 
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Given a recurrent communication class Xi, an i-tree is a directed graph with a vertex for each 
communication class and a unique directed path leading from each class j (≠ i) to i.   The 
stochastic potential of a recurrent communication class Xj  is then defined by finding an i-tree 
that minimizes the summed resistance over directed edges, and setting the stochastic potential 
equal to that summed resistance. 
 
Given any state x, an x-tree is a directed graph with a vertex for each state and a unique directed 
path leading from each state y  (≠ x) to x.   The resistance of x is then defined by finding an x-
tree that minimizes the summed resistance over directed edges. 
 
The following theorem is a combination of Theorem 4 and Lemmas 1 and 2 in Young: 
 
Theorem [Young (1993)]: Let P be the transition matrix associated with a stationary Markov 
process on a finite state space with a set of mutations {P(ε)} and with corresponding (unique) 
stationary distributions {m(ε)}.  Then m(ε) converges to a stationary distribution m of P, and a 
state x has mx  > 0 if and only if x is in a recurrent communication class of P which has a minimal 
stochastic potential.  This is equivalent to x having minimum resistance. 
 
Now let us return to the details of Theorem 1.   Let us describe what must be true of any β in 
B(G).  Consider a player in Group 1.  It is easily checked that if s is a state where at least q of 
players in the Group 2 vote A, then regardless of the voting behavior of players in Group 1, the 
best response for the player anticipating s in G(ε) for small enough ε is to vote A.23   Similarly if 
fewer than q of the players in Group 2 vote A, then the unique best response anticipating s in 
G(ε) for small enough ε is to vote B.  Thus, for small enough ε, any best-response 
correspondence maps states that have both groups electing to play A to a state where all players 
vote to play A, and similarly for B.  In states where the groups are miscoordinating and one 
group is electing to play A and the other group is electing to play B, any best response takes us to 
a situation where all players in the first group vote to play B and all players in the second group 
                                                          
23 This is clear if the player were determining the action of his or her group.  As the trembles of his group are 
independent of those of the other group, regardless of their play the player raises the probability of matching the 
other group by matching their play him or herself. 
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vote to play A.   Now consider the associated Markov process with small ε.   Here there are three 
recurrent communication classes.  They are a state where all players vote A; a state where all 
players vote B; and the two states where one group all votes A and the other group all votes B 
(these two states communicate with each other).  We need only understand the resistance 
between these states to characterize the steady-state distribution as ε goes to 0.  The resistance of 
leaving a state where all players vote A is n-q+1.   The resistance of leaving a state where all 
players vote B is q..   The resistance of leaving a state where one group is all voting A and the 
other group is all voting B is min[n-q+1,q].  We can build the trees as follows.  Let us examine 
the case where q is no more than n/2 (the proof in the other case is analogous).   Label our three 
communication classes A, B and A/B in the obvious way.  Building a tree to class A, we can 
point both class B and class A/B to class A.  This leads to a total resistance of this tree is 2q.  
Building a tree to class B requires a resistance of q from class A/B that can be mapped to A; but 
requires a resistance of n-q+1 to leave state A regardless of where it is pointed.  This leads to a 
resistance of n+1.  The same is true for a tree to class A/B.  In both cases 2q < n+1, and so the 
state where all vote A is the only state in the limiting steady-state distribution.   
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Appendix B – Aggregated rates for adding links, by individual and game 
 
Table B1 – Games starting with 9’s 
Participant # Mutual Unilateral 2 for 4 2 for 2 
1 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.00 
2 1.00 0.67 - 0.00 
3 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.00 
4 0.00 0.60 - 0.00 
5 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.00 
6 0.00 0.87 0.53 0.00 
7 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
8 0.13 0.53 - 0.00 
9 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.00 
10 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.00 
11 0.00 0.73 - 0.00 
12 0.87 0.87 - 0.00 
13 0.07 0.93 - 1.00 
14 0.07 1.00 - 1.00 
15 0.00 1.00 - 1.00 
16 0.47 0.53 0.67 0.73 
33 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
34 0.00 0.87 - 0.67 
35 0.20 0.27 0.60 1.00 
36 0.00 1.00 - 0.87 
37 0.00 1.00 0.93 0.93 
38 1.00 0.93 0.93 0.93 
39 0.27 0.40 0.60 0.07 
40 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 
41 0.00 0.53 0.67 0.87 
42 0.27 1.00 0.93 1.00 
43 0.00 0.67 - 0.00 
44 0.87 0.00 - 0.73 
45 0.87 0.93 - 1.00 
46 0.20 0.93 - 1.00 
47 0.87 0.53 - 1.00 
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48 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.93 
65 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.00 
66 0.00 0.93 - 0.00 
67 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 
68 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 
69 0.87 1.00 1.00 0.00 
70 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.13 
71 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.73 
72 0.87 1.00 - 0.00 
73 0.00 0.80 0.33 0.07 
74 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.13 
75 1.00 1.00 - 0.80 
76 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 
77 0.00 0.93 - 0.00 
78 0.00 0.67 - 0.00 
79 0.00 1.00 - 1.00 
80 0.00 0.87 1.00 0.87 
Table B2 – Games starting with 8’s 
Participant # Mutual Unilateral 2 for 4 2 for 2 
17 1.00 1.00 0.40 1.00 
18 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 
19 1.00 1.00 0.13 1.00 
20 1.00 1.00 - 0.20 
21 0.00 0.07 0.13 1.00 
22 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 
23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24 0.00 0.00 - 1.00 
25 0.93 1.00 0.27 0.13 
26 0.00 0.93 0.07 0.00 
27 0.07 1.00 - 0.13 
28 0.20 1.00 - 1.00 
29 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 
30 0.60 0.87 - 0.60 
31 0.47 1.00 - 0.73 
32 0.27 1.00 0.13 0.93 
49 0.93 1.00 0.07 0.07 
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50 0.00 1.00 - 0.93 
51 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 
52 0.00 1.00 - 1.00 
53 0.13 1.00 0.00 0.07 
54 0.13 1.00 0.07 1.00 
55 0.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 
56 0.07 0.00 - 0.07 
57 0.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 
58 0.13 1.00 1.00 1.00 
59 0.13 1.00 - 0.93 
60 0.93 1.00 - 0.13 
61 0.00 1.00 - 0.00 
62 0.00 0.93 - 0.00 
63 0.00 0.93 - 0.00 
64 0.07 0.93 0.00 0.07 
81 1.00 0.93 1.00 1.00 
82 0.53 1.00 - 1.00 
83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
84 0.33 0.00 - 0.93 
85 0.07 0.07 1.00 1.00 
86 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
87 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
88 0.00 1.00 - 1.00 
89 0.00 0.93 0.00 1.00 
90 0.93 0.00 0.00 1.00 
91 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 
92 0.00 0.07 - 1.00 
93 0.07 0.73 - 0.07 
94 0.40 1.00 - 0.27 
95 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 
96 0.00 1.00 0.13 1.00 
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Appendix C 
 
 
Complete Individual Profiles Across Games 
Profile - start with 9’s # of occurrences  Profile - start with 8’s # of occurrences 
A,A,0,A 3  A,A,0,A 3 
A,A,A,A 3  A,A,A,A 4 
A,A,0,D 3  A,A,0,D 1 
A,A,A,D 2  A,A,M,A 1 
A,M,0,A 1  A,A,D,A 1 
A,D,0,A 1  A,A,D,D 2 
M,M,A,A 1  A,D,D,A 1 
D,A,A,A 3  M,A,0,A 2 
D,A,0,A 7  M,A,0,M 1 
D,A,0,D 5  M,A,0,D 1 
D,A,D,A 1  D,A,A,A 3 
D,A,D,D 6  D,A,0,A 5 
D,A,M,D 1  D,A,0,D 6 
D,M,A,A 1  D,A,D,A 4 
D,M,0,D 2  D,A,D,D 3 
D,M,M,D 1  D,D,0,A 3 
D,M,D,D 2  D,D,A,A 1 
D,D,0,D 2  D,D,0,D 2 
D,D,A,D 1  D,D,D,A 2 
D,D,M,A 1  D,D,D,D 2 
D,D,D,D 1    
All 48  All 48 
 
The order of the games in both profiles is: mutual, unilateral, 2 for 4, and 2 for 2. 
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“A” means an individual chose to add a link 10 of more times (of 15 in the respective segment), 
“D” means an individual chose to not add a link 10 or more times, “M” means an individual 
chose both actions at least six times, and “0” means an individual had no choice in the game 
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Appendix D - Experimental Instructions (Start with 9’s) 
 
Welcome to our experiment.  You will receive $5 for showing up, in addition to your earnings 
from the session.   
 
There will be a total of 60 periods in the session.  You will be paired with a group of people (and 
your position in the group will stay the same) for 15 periods, and then your pairing will change 
for the next 15 periods, etc.   
 
Payoffs for each person are determined by the links that exist in the network below at the end of 
a period.  Your group begins with the following links: 
              
             A         B 
           (9)                    (9) 
      
            
 
 
 
               
             C          D 
(9)        (9) 
 
If this network is in place at the end of the period, then each of A, B, C, and D would receive 9 
units, as is indicated by the bold number in parentheses below each letter.  
 
Some or all of the people in the network will simultaneously indicate on their computer their 
choice concerning whether or not to add a link to the person diagonally opposite.  There are 4 
different cases, and you will make choices in each case for15 periods during the session: 
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1) People are in 4-person groups.  Consider the people diagonally across: A link is added if 
at least one of these two people wishes to add it. 
2) People are in 4-person groups.  Consider the people diagonally across: A link is added if 
and only if both of these two people wish to add it. 
3) People are in 4-person groups; however, only two of these people (not diagonally across 
from each other) choose whether to add links.  Each person’s decision is implemented 
and two silent participants in the group receive payoffs according to these choices. 
4) People are in 2-person groups, so that each person controls 2 vertices.  If a person 
chooses to add a link, it is added and he or she receives the payoffs from one vertex. 
 
You will always know which case applies to your decision before you make your decision. 
 
There are four possible networks that could result from the process of adding or not adding links.  
The first is the network pictured above, where there are no changes.  The other three possibilities 
arise if at least one link is added.   These networks, and the corresponding payoffs to the 
participants are as follows: 
 
 
           A    B        A          B   
          (8)               (1)       (1)          (8)                          
                                                    
         
 
 
 
 
 
C    D        C          D 
           (1)              (8)       (8)          (1)  
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      A              B 
    (8)             (8)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      C             D 
(8)            (8) 
 
The diagrams show that if exactly one diagonal link is included in the final network, the people 
connected by the link receive 8 units and the people not connected by the diagonal link receive 1 
unit. 
 
If both diagonal links are included in the final network, then everyone in the network receives 8 
units.   
 
We will randomly choose one period from each of the 15-period blocks for payment, so that only 
four periods will actually count towards monetary payoffs.  These periods will be chosen at the 
end of the session.  We will add up your payoffs from these four periods and convert them to 
actual dollars at the rate of $0.30 for each unit. 
 
At the end of the experiment, we will pay each participant individually and privately. 
 
We encourage you to ask questions about the instructions by raising your hand. 
 
Thank you again for your participation in our research. 
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